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1. Introduction
In Darren Aronofsky's 2006 film The Fountain [39], the protagonist,
Tommy—played by Hugh Jackman—proclaims to a laboratory col-
league after his wife dies from brain cancer, “Death is a disease. It's like
any other. And there's a cure… and I will find it.” While this re-framing
of death as a medical diagnosis to overcome and in need of a “cure”
may seem facetious—or perhaps, to some, horrifying—humankind's
array of religions have spent at least a section of their scriptures trying
to explain away death's finality [32]. Until quite recently in human
history, death has been less articulated to materialistic notions of the
physical but instead has been coupled with discussions about the
spiritual.
Somewhat situated at the crossroads of the physical and the spiritual
is the transhumanist movement. The transhumanists are a meliorist
movement that hope to enhance human intellect and physiology by
applying scientific and technological advances to “enhance” individual
human bodies. The movement can be traced back to Nikolai Fedorovich
Fedorov's “cosmist” movement at the turn of the 20th century whose
goals consisted of: establishing universal immortality for human beings,
resurrecting the dead, engineering the human body for spaceflight, and
freedom of movement throughout the cosmos [41]. One modern en-
actment of the transhumanist philosophy is that of cryopreservation, or
freezing one's body after death with the hope of being reanimated in the
future.
In this article, I will be focusing specifically on cryopreservation and
two of the American biotechnomedical tenets introduced by Robbie
Davis-Floyd and Gloria St. John [5] in their technocratic model of
medicine: the “body as machine” and “death as defeat.” These axioms
are embraced by both the biotechnomedical establishment as well as
the cryopreservation communities when they discuss the future of hu-
mankind. In particular, I will be focusing on the political economy of
cryopreservation as an embodiment of American neoliberalism—as
well as a Durkheimian death ritual—in the twenty-first century. Finally,
I will theorize on a future populated by human beings from “the past”
and the implications and consequences that may be caused by con-
temporary humans experiencing a temporal shift from traveling in deep
time vis-à-vis cryopreservation.
2. Cryonic assemblages
Cryopreservation is the practice of accepting a body after medical
“death” and cooling a patient's body to −196 °C in order to “vitrify”
them: to replace over half of the water in the human body with che-
micals that prevent cell damage caused by ice crystals, and freezing the
body to a stable, ice-free state. After vitrification, the patient1 is stored
within vacuum-insulated dewars stabilized at a temperature of−196 °C
with liquid nitrogen in order to await a future in which biomedical
technologies may be able to reanimate them [1]. The idea behind
cryopreservation—like many modern technological ad-
vancements—was first introduced in science fiction [31]. Robert C.W
Ettinger's [9] book The Prospect of Immortality calls for humanity to
enter “freezer programs” immediately after medical death in the hopes
that one day scientific advancements would be able to restore life or
even grant the patient with immortality.
While this may sound like pure science fiction, many cryopre-
servation advocates claim that the practice is scientifically realizable,
even if it cannot be theoretically or technically validated by current
scientific methods. However, that is not to say that contemporary
medical studies are not experimenting with techniques relevant to
cryopreservation. Recent experiments have shown that induced hy-
pothermia after cardiac arrest resuscitation has prevented—or slo-
wed—neurological, renal, and other issues related to the cessation of
blood flow from the heart [2,27]. Additionally, there have been cases
discussed by Abou Farman [10; 742] of patients resuscitated with little
to no cerebral impairment after suffering “accidental hypothermia,”
such as falling into frozen rivers, being buried under avalanches, etc.
This research has excited cryonic and cryopreservation advocates and
proves, in some of their minds at least, the feasibility of cryopreserva-
tion. Furthermore, many cryopreservation advocates assert that the
criterion for death will continue to shift as biotechnomedicine con-
tinues to advance, and a patient placed immediately into cryopre-
servation after they're pronounced “legally dead” by a doctor in 2018
may not be considered dead at all by a doctor in 2118—but rather, they
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will be seen as a patient in suspended animation awaiting revival.
Once again, this may not be as fantastical as it sounds if one com-
pares it to the amount of flexibility that existed in when a patient was
considered “dead” prior to the Uniform Determination of Death Act.
This model state law was designed to standardize when a patient was
considered “legally dead,” and as of 2018 it has been adopted by 38
states, including the District of Columbia [7]. However, cryopreserva-
tion advocates make a distinction between a “legally dead” patient who
has lost brain function and “information theoretical death”—that is,
according to the cryopreservationists, the point when the patient's
personality, memories, hopes, dreams can no longer be salvaged—-
which advocates claim is prevented by immediately cryopreserving a
patient who has been declared dead by a doctor [34]. Therefore, death
becomes socially constructed, as well as a process, rather than a mo-
ment [10]. This also illustrates the fact that terms like “consciousness”
and “death” are part of a contested terrain that are shaped more by the
political side of biopolitics than the medical side [30]. Through this
shift, cryopreservation advocates play out a narrative utilizing current
biomedical terminology in order to bound their reality of when “actual”
death occurs as being after “information theoretical death” [31].
American biotechnomedicine's relationship with death as a social
and legal process has also been quite fluid. Most recently, the phe-
nomena of so-called “beating heart cadavers” has been sensationalized
in Dick Teresi's [38] book on the topic. He highlights the fluctuating
moments of death within medicine as sliding between heart-death and
brain-death. One doctor interviewed by Teresi [38; 145] refers to brain-
dead patients who are kept alive with ventilators as “pretty dead.” That
is, their lungs are still breathing, their hearts are still beating, but this
medical decision is only pursued so that blood can be circulated
throughout the body in order to keep the organs viable for harvesting.
In contrast, a person whose heart has stopped beating is considered
“dead-dead,” and if this happens to a patient who is already “pretty
dead,” medical staff will still attempt to “resuscitate,” despite the pa-
tient existing within this liminal landscape of death [38]. It is important
to stress that this perspective is explicitly Americanist; for example,
Japanese medical professionals and public have long been critical of
brain-death equating human-death. In fact, Japanese law allows for
citizens to choose for themselves which death will be legally recognized
for them: heart-death or brain-death [22]. This critical stance toward
brain-death has begun to take hold within the U.S., especially as sus-
picious symptoms—such as racing heartbeats during organ harvesting
surgeries on the “pretty dead”—have been reported by transplant sur-
geons [38]. Furthermore, a study conducted at Stony Brook University
found that of the 2060 survivors of cardiac arrest interviewed, 46%
reported “post-resuscitation memories” and 2% reported full awareness
after medical death [26]. This leads Teresi [38; 150] to pose the
gruesome question: “What does a ‘pretty dead’ patient experience
during a three- to five-hour harvest sans anesthetic?”
The Alcor Life Extension Foundation2 subscribes to this liminal
death model but reaches further than the current medical establish-
ment: “Cryonics is not a belief that the dead can be revived. Cryonics is
a belief that no one is really dead until the information content of the
brain is lost, and that low temperatures can prevent this loss” [4]. The
cryopreservation institution's entire scientific and business model is
dependent on this hope. In a way, cryopreservation is a fight against
entropy; a battle against the heat death of the universe within the
human microcosm.3
The compartmentalization of death, life, consciousness, and what
exactly it means to be a human is drawn from a radical reimagining of
the mind-body separation argued by Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, and
other Western philosophers. This Cartesian dualism was initially in-
spired by, and is now fused with, the hegemonic institutions of scien-
tific materialism [33]. This scientific hegemony is paired with the
“supervaluation of science and technology,” [5; 34] which elevates
biotechnomedicine (including cryonics) to a revered status within our
technocratic capitalist society—even if cryopreservation may evoke the
same smug smirk today that was given to those advocating airplanes in
the early twentieth century.
In fact, I would challenge scholars studying cryopreservation to take
members of cryopreservation organizations at their word, rather than
having to first laugh off the implausibility of it all—much like how Puar
[29], in her book Terrorist Assemblages, argues against the tendency that
before one talks about suicide bombers, one tends to first feel the need
to morally condemn them in order to alleviate risk. It is unclear whe-
ther these actions are taken in order to perform as the “rational aca-
demic” for colleagues and the academy at large, but it levies an amount
of unethical disrespect toward research participants. Critiquing cryo-
preservation is important—and I will be doing a fair amount of that
starting with the next paragraph—but a critical position holds far more
weight when one begins with a relativistic stance. All research on
matters concerning the future contain a high level of speculative ima-
gination, and this foundation of uncertainty is shared between aca-
demics and cryopreservation advocates alike.
That said, it can be troubling when modern biotechnoscience sup-
ports the scientific materialist compartmentalization of human
beings—the Cartesian breaking down of people into “body-machine”
objects [5; 23]. In Donna Haraway's [15; 301] recent engagements with
her construction of the cyborg, she states that she no longer views cy-
borgs as hybrids, but instead as “imploded entities, dense material
semiotic ‘things’—articulated string figures of ontologically hetero-
geneous, historically situated, materially rich, virally proliferating re-
lating of particular sorts.” This multifaceted approach to what we
consider human—and ways in which cryopreservation interacts with
the human and the nonhuman—is what I am calling the cryonic as-
semblage. Puar [29; 217], in writing about suicide bombers, proposes a
definition that also works within the cryonic assemblage: “Assemblage
here points to the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial,
energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body
and technology…” When the human body—or parts of the human
body—are drained, vitrified, and encased within techno-dewars that
monitor and adjust temperatures autonomously, the cryonic assem-
blage seems to breach the most popular biological ontology of what it
means to be human.
The cryonic assemblage takes seriously Rabinow and Rose's [30]
discussion of the possibility for a new regime of biopower to take shape
centered around novel configurations of knowledge, power, and sub-
jectivity within biotechnomedical fields. My proposed cryonic assem-
blage includes a plea to think outside of the traditional Foucauldian
configurations of biopower and to reflect on how contemporary cryo-
preservation advocates and organizations might be able to colonize and
transform pre-existing apparatuses—such as the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, government investment, patient and lobbying groups, and bio-
technomedical companies—in ways that may fundamentally change the
way we think about health and medicine in the United States. These
structural “mutations,” as Rabinow and Rose [30; 214] call them, will
most likely be minute and diffuse, making it much harder to spot their
effects in the short term, if they make a difference at all. However, from
the perspective of the future, these new regimes of biopower have the
potential to completely reconfigure relations of knowledge, power, and
expertise surrounding life, death, and time itself and, if nothing else,
that possibility should be taken seriously as a subject of scholarly inquiry
[30].
2 Alcor is a Scottsdale, Arizona based NGO that researches, advocates, and performs
cryonic services. As of January 31, 2018 they have 1149 members (those who have
elected for cryopreservation), 292 associate members (those who have not made cryo-
preservation plans but wish to financially support Alcor's mission), and 155 patients who
are cryopreserved.
3 This turn of phrase is owed to Martin Pfeiffer, who elegantly expressed this to me
during our conversations on the topic.
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3. Cryonics as embodied neoliberalism & time as commodity
Emile Durkheim [8] was an influential social scientist that sys-
temically and academically engaged with the meanings behind death
rituals in his The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Durkheim
claimed that mortuary rites served primarily to promote social cohesion
and to reaffirm common societal values. While this simplification ig-
nores many of the nuances that exist within humanity's use of symbol,
myth, and ritual, there remains an important kernel of truth animating
his observations. Kiong and Schiller [18; 5] echo Durkheim in their
assertion that “death rituals must… be viewed as culturally heightened
activities; they conflate, refract, and highlight a people's most im-
portant values.” Cryopreservation has largely been an American prac-
tice ever since Dr. James Benford became the first person to be cryo-
preserved in 1967.4 There are two main cryopreservation
companies—Cryonics Institute in Detroit, Michigan and the Alcor Life
Extension Foundation in Scottsdale, Arizona—as well as a third orga-
nization, Suspended Animation, based in Florida, that only handles the
vitrification process [10]. So, if we view the practice of cryopreserva-
tion as an American community's Durkheimian death ritual, what sort
of values would we see rise to the surface?
Tiffany Romain [31; 205] claims that the “imaginaries that
permeate cryonics are not simply of radically extended lifespans, but
are technophilic, biological materialist, American, atheistic, [right-]
libertarian, and masculine in nature.” Farman [10] reports observing
similarly gendered and technoutopian ideological imaginaries during
his experience working with cryopreservation advocates. The cryopre-
servation community may be illuminating essential American values, as
these tenets are also present within the American neoliberal ima-
ginary.5 Capitalism is predicated on the assumption that people will
frame their identity through their possessions, based on a fear of ma-
terial scarcity and loss, in an extension of what Marx [21] called
commodity fetishism. Cryopreservation plays into this fear of loss by
offering not only an insurance policy against the ultimate loss (one's
own life), but also possibilities of additional material and/or wealth
accumulation in the future [31].
Michel Foucault's analysis of biopower continues to lay the foun-
dation for how cryopreservation can be articulated as an embodiment
of neoliberalism. Foucault's theorizations on biopower offer a two-
pronged commentary that can be helpful when thought of as a pre-
cursor to neoliberalism, particularly as it relates to the overall cryo-
preservation project. The first is that of the distributed disciplining of
bodies and subjectivities and the way that discipline can pervasively
affect space(s) and movement(s) inhabited by those bodies and sub-
jectivities [11,12]. The second is that of biopolitical power, or biopo-
litics, which looks specifically at governmentality and populations, ra-
ther than the individualized subject/bodies; of particular importance to
cryopreservation, Foucault [13,14] looks at the ways that biopolitical
technologies intrude in the life cycles of populations and begin to in-
culcate certain values, such as the embodied market relations of neo-
liberalism.
Cryopreservation, then, becomes the apex of neoliberal thinking.
The neoliberal promise is that one has the “individual liberty” to save
for retirement, for medical emergencies, for education, a car, a house.
The inescapable specter of death, however, has always been un-
conquerable by capital—no matter how hard one has pulled themselves
up by their bootstraps. Cryopreservation is presented as a solution that
resolves the American fear of death while feeding into the mythos of
neoliberalism: that the individual paired with the free-market is an
undisputed, powerful cure-all for society's problems. Furthermore,
cryopreservation infuses neoliberalism directly into the human body; it
turns the body into a special type of property that is able to be invested
and banked, with a potential return of immortality in the future [31]. In
fact, Farman [10] illustrates how the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act—a
law passed in 1968 that allows patients to transfer their bodies to
cryopreservation organizations as donations for scientific resear-
ch—legally allows the body to be broken down into property, into parts,
into things. Instead of the Puarian [29; 217] "body-weapon" of suicide
bombers, cryopreservation opens up an embodied ontological engage-
ment that could be described as body-capital. Cryopreservation literally
commodifies the assemblages of the body and then recomposes that
cryonic assemblage according to the dictates and logic of capitalism,
contributing to what Kaushik Sunder Rajan [37] calls “technoscientific
capitalism.” Furthermore, body-capital of the cryopreserved is directly
related to the medically enabled redefinition of death-as-process in the
“pretty dead” status of beating heart cadavers as well as an extension of
the long standing commodified body-capital markets of plasma, eggs,
sperm, stem cells, etc.
The ethical issues and problems of governance that exist within the
broader cryonics markets relate to issues that may arise within cryo-
preservation circles. In 2016, the United States military decided to
extend cryonic benefits to service members, allowing them to freeze
their eggs or sperm for future use [17]. This opens up potential legal
conflicts arising from these new forms of subjectivity and life, not to
mention the social and religious controversies that have long simmered
since cryonic technologies became marketable. For example, does a
child conceived from a frozen egg (or sperm) after the death of the egg
(or sperm) donor deserve military death benefits from the U.S. gov-
ernment?
Enlightenment and modernist conceptions of expertise and experts
are explicit enablers of this type of capitalist parsing of bodies and life
processes. The social construction of expertise has allowed for the rise
of a situation where people learn a certain set of skills that imbues them
with the power to become the keepers of brains and bodies within this
neoliberal capitalist system, giving them control of life and death ac-
cording to their version of reality. The construction of expertise and the
creation of an expert class are engrained with a certain amount of
power and political capital. Experts have the ability to wield author-
ity—a political concept—over questions of true belief without being
democratically accountable to their truths [11,40].
However, expertise is not a monolithic practice, it is always in a
state of flux that is open to being challenged. Expertise is constantly
being socialized and reproduced, mobilized through institutionaliza-
tion, and naturalized through expert enactments as a body of knowl-
edge [3]. Experts are intertwined and constructed within the Rabinow
and Rose [30] triad of knowledge-power-subjectivity that mobilize and
constitute links between life, truth, and value according to the multiple
logics that exist within the capitalization of biotechnomedicine, as well
as whether commercial enterprises are allied or autonomous from
States and their spheres of ideological influence. For example, expertise
about smoking risk that flow from the American Cancer Society or the
Centers for Disease Control are most likely going to differ significantly
from the experts employed by Philip Morris. Expertise can dialectically
repel and overlap depending on how the expert implicitly configures
their truth, power, and subjectivity [30].
Especially in the field of cryonics, experts may not necessarily
subscribe to the traditional medical logic that their duty consists of the
restoration of biological normativity that may have been lost during
illness, but instead cryopreservation advocates are “engaged in the
molecular re-engineering of life itself” [30; 212, emphasis Rabinow and
4 For 38 years, cryopreservation was only practiced within the United States. However,
in 2005, КриоРус (KryoRus) publically opened in Moscow. On their website, KryoRus
claims to have successfully cryopreserved 56 people and 22 pets [19].
5 It is here that I would like to quickly gloss the term “neoliberal(ism),” since the word
has, in recent years, been used rather indiscriminately as a blanket pejorative by a wide
range of scholars. Broadly, neoliberalism is a belief that human well-being can best ad-
vance by extending competitive market relations into every aspect of human life—-
including the economy, politics, and society; beginning in the 1970s, this belief has been
hegemonically propagated by inculcating certain market-based values and social prac-
tices into every part of American life [16,35,36]. This gives the effect that neoliberalism is
both everywhere (“This is the way it has always been!”) and nowhere (“You radicals are
just making things up!”).
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Rose's]. The political economy of this knowledge production is founded
on both scientist and patient hope, generated through the stakeholder's
expectation that capital-s Science will accelerate linearly and usher in
an optimistic future that exists within their imaginations [24]. Fur-
thermore, hope becomes a node for biotechnomedical companies to
leverage capital while reframing their future imaginaries in the present
[31].
The irony of cryopreservation advocates claiming to be preserving
people while simultaneously slashing a person into “de-peopled” body
parts—in some cases literally, such as when a patient has elected for
neuropreservation (i.e. preservation of just their head)—is not the only
paradox that exists in this interpretation of embodied neoliberalism.
There exists an additional and deeper contradiction in the seeming
reversal of how capitalist logics view the embodied difference between
the worker and the bourgeoisie. Marx [21], in his conversations on
worker alienation, refers to the worker's body as being like a cog within
the machine of capital—always able to be replaced and swapped out
with another worker. In our present neoliberal age, capitalist philo-
sophy has become so pervasive that it has degraded human logic to the
point where even the capitalist views their own bodies through the lens
of exchange value. In this way, cryopreservation can be framed as an
augmentation of biopower and optimization: capitalists are extending
the power of capital to expropriate value not only from the relations of
production with the worker, but also with themselves [23].
Cryopreservation provides a market in which the capitalist is now
able to commodify their own body after death, an apparent reversal of
the Frankenstein story. In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley writes of an elite
anatomist who constructs a monster literally from worker's bodies; this
collection of proletarian parts awakens—seemingly gaining a class
consciousness and literally breaking free from its chains—and attacks
the capitalist class. In our neoliberal present, the capitalist has become
the monster, with the workers acting as Dr. Frankenstein, decon-
structing and banking the bodies of the rich who utilize a warped ca-
pitalist logic of investing one's sense of self and ideology for an un-
known deep future.
The neoliberal narrative espoused by cryopreservation institutions
and their advocates reinforces the mythology that capitalism is some
kind of eternal force. In fact, these cryopreservation institutions are
using time as a commodity, perpetuating the idea that everything—even
time itself—can and will be commodified [31]. Governments (or the
lack thereof) in the future may decide it is unethical to reanimate
human beings from the past and the contracts that patients hold with
cryopreservation companies may become null and void. Or perhaps
legal contracts themselves will be a curiosity, a relic of the past, espe-
cially if corporatism and capitalism have been eradicated [34]. On the
flip side, if our future descends into despotism, who is to say that pa-
tients will not be used as slaves, whose bodies are technically owned by
the cryopreservation institutions themselves?
Many cryopreservation advocates do not seem to critically analyze
what it means to be awakened in the deep future, beyond their own
ideologically driven preconceptions about a temporally disconnected
life. In Guy Debord's [6] The Society of the Spectacle, he introduces a
concept called “spectacular time.” In Thesis 152, he writes that “ca-
pitalism has begun selling ‘fully equipped’ blocks of time, each of which
is a complete commodity combining a variety of other commodities” [6;
111]. Capital demands time of the worker—what Marx calls labor-
time—and this, in turn, becomes a measure of value. However, Marx's
theory of value being grounded in temporal finitude is only implicit,
coming out only occasionally, such as in the “voice of the worker”
section of “The Limits of the Working Day” in Capital 1: “apart from
natural deterioration through age etc., I must be able to work tomorrow
with the same normal amount of strength, health and freshness as
today” [21; 343]. Debord [6; 114] says this relationship between the
capitalist and the worker is the “violent expropriation of their time.”
Furthermore, Debord says that the “American way of death” de-
pends solely on “how much of the appearance of life can be maintained
in the individual's encounter with death” [6; 115, emphasis Debord's].
What appears more like life within the American conceptions of death
than cryonic slumber, in which one's death is not finite, but merely a
liminal stage before eternal life in the deep future? Debord continues by
saying that due to advertising campaigns, Americans feel that “it is
simply forbidden to get old,” which plays into what he calls the “capital
of youth” [6; 115]. Articulating this framework to cryonic imaginaries
and motivations allows us to account for the right-libertarian vision of
the future—that is, capital is natural and inescapable and that tech-
nology is always progressive and for “good”—while also considering
the American fear of death and the obsession to remain youthful.
I propose that revived patients would be regarded as temporal re-
fugees. If not labeled as such by those in the future, they may begin to
utilize that label for themselves. These temporal refugees would be
entering a time that harbors no sense of belonging, no language fa-
miliarity, no kinship, and no relation to the culture of time that the
refugee was used to. After all, if governments and people within our
own time cannot accepted mass migration across our planet freely and
without malice, how would humans in the future feel about those who
are also temporally disconnected? Furthermore, would the ontological
assumptions about what is considered a “human being” still be uniform
and recognizable in the future to a cryopreservation patient from the
twenty-first century?
4. Temporal oddities
During a conversation with anthropologist David Valentine, we
discussed the phenomena of futurist philosophers and companies al-
ways announcing that humanity is only a few short decades away from
a massive breakthrough in technology—whether that be the singularity,
the spread of humanity beyond our planet, the discovery of cold fusion
techniques, contact with intelligent extraterrestrial life, etc. He labeled
this phenomena “uneven temporality” (Valentine, personal commu-
nication, October 13, 2016). Futurist discourse has often been frag-
mented and possessed a quality of hopeful unevenness. Perhaps that is
why it is latched onto so quickly and easily within the lay technofuturist
imaginary. Within the Enlightenment, meliorist tradition, one always
wants to hope and believe that they are living in a time that is on the
leading edge of innovation, not stuck in a quagmire era labeled status-
quo or degenerative. I find it interesting that these futurist imaginaries
are vaporous—a mirage, or a rainbow—they are always fixed in the
distance. And when one arrives in the time in which apparent in-
novations are supposed to exist, scientific promises continue to remain
in the distance, just over that next hill.
But these promises are more than idle words; they are intertwined
with the neoliberal project. The integration of market values into the
imaginaries of technoutopic innovation ask us to focus on an implied
glorious future while insinuating that the suffering many of us are ex-
periencing in the present should be bracketed for the sake of that time-
to-come [28]. However, the sad reality is that many continue to suffer
while stumbling forward on the neoliberal treadmill, arms outstretched
toward the phantasm of a better and brighter future that never arrives.
This stalemate also effects cryopreservation advocates themselves,
some of whom forgo having children, buying non-functional furniture
or art, and spending money on anything they may consider frivolous; as
Romain [31; 208] points out, this kind of contemporary worldly asce-
ticism is one of “work and preparation” for a promised sunnier future
that will reward their sacrifice and devotion. Furthermore, many
cryopreservation advocates will take out insurance policies, naming the
cryopreservation company as the beneficiary, in order to make cryo-
preservation affordable [31]. Not only does this open up the possibility
for corruption, it is a further act of piety to the cryopreservation project
through relinquishment of individual agency to the cause.
To conclude, since I began this article with a film reference, I feel I
should end it with one as well. In the Coen Brothers' film O Brother,
Where Art Thou? [25], George Clooney's character—Ulysses Everett
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McGill—berates a shop clerk who says he must wait two weeks for a car
part, as well as an additional two weeks for McGill's favorite pomade
(he doesn't want Fop, damnit, he's a Dapper Dan man!). McGill loudly
exclaims, “Well, ain't this place a geographical oddity! Two weeks from
everywhere!” So I would like to tweak Valentine's label and propose the
phrase temporal oddity to describe this similar acceptance by the public
when it comes to the technological imaginary—always twenty years
away from solving humankind's troubles! But even if these temporal
oddities somehow manifest into a reality, the problems of becoming a
temporal refugee remain, as imagined in the episode “The Neutral
Zone” in Star Trek: The Next Generation, where one “cryonaut” was
awaked 375 years in the future only to proclaim that they felt as if they
were “out of time, a relic.”
I should make it clear that I do not believe that hope for a brighter
future is necessarily a bad concept. In fact, I would consider myself a
critical utopianist. However, I caution fellow futurists not to buy in-
to—or espouse—an un-nuanced, rose-tinted disregard for the problems
we have within our contemporary reality. These problems are not going
to be eliminated solely by rationally-applied technology and the pas-
sage of time; this is the great danger of utopianism. Our current reality
should be treated as an analogue for our future and we must fight and
defeat the enormous array of social and economic injustices that plague
us, especially within the United States. Hopes, dreams, and an opti-
mistic striving for a utopian future are good motivations, as long as one
enacts them through social justice and decolonial critiques of those
futures. If this is disregarded, we are doomed to a future that is as rife
with inequality and misery as many of us suffer from in the pre-
sent—and that is no future that I want to awaken into. If this warning is
disregarded, put me in the ground with my ancestors, for perhaps hu-
mans are not quite ready for the potential positive advancement toward
mutual aid, of which our species is capable.
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